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Korea Divided: The Best Way Forward
Simon Gonsalves
I. Introduction
 In 1993, Bill Clinton visited the Republic of Korea as part of his tour of 
Northeast Asia. As President Clinton was looking across the Demilitarized Zone, 
he described the terrain he saw as one of the scariest places on Earth (William 
i). Since then, the Korean Peninsula has become even more perilous, and the 
reunification of North and South Korea seems as far away as ever. However 
opaque the future may be, it is still important to analyze the question of Korean 
reunification, as the international ramifications of a single Korea are not to be 
underestimated. This essay examines the circumstances under which the northern 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the southern Republic of 
Korea (ROK) could be reunified under a single government.
The most likely scenario for the unification of the Korean peninsula 
would be the internal collapse of the North Korean state and its subsequent 
occupation by the ROK. This argument is organized into three parts. The first 
section recounts the history of Korea’s separation. This section discusses the 
attempts at political amalgamation within both countries from the 1950–1953 
conflict onward. The next section outlines potential scenarios for unification 
and summarizes the most probable way reunification might be accomplished. 
The final section evaluates the potential fallout reunification would cause from 
both a Korean and an international perspective. Throughout the paper, historical 
examples will offer comparisons to recent history. These sub-topics provide 
real-world examples that relate to a potential Korean reunification. Historical 
appraisals are important because they apply the lessons of history to help make 
sense of the complicated questions regarding the unification of Korea.
It is important to note that the DPRK is one of the most closed societies 
in the world and does not publish reliable statistics. This scarcity of statistics 
makes analysis of North Korea’s political and economic systems difficult (“South 
Korea vs. North Korea”). Specifics regarding the DPRK are far from infallible, 
and at times even the most precise statistics are closer to educated guesses than 
facts. The DPRK’s isolationist and secretive nature creates an environment 
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where the country’s internal affairs are kept secret and little information escapes 
to the outside world. Consequently, the ideas argued throughout this paper 
are advanced with a lack of a North Korean perspective and situation clarity, 
something that may prevent a complete picture of a plausible reunification from 
being conveyed.  However, the evidence that is available through South Korea, 
international sources, and historical comparisons will be utilized to mitigate the 
hindrances of the DPRK’s closed society.
II. History of Korea’s Separation
To understand the modern Korean peninsula and the seemingly 
permanent hostility between the North and the South, it is vital to understand 
how the ROK and the DPRK drifted so far apart. Koreans share millennia of 
common history and are one of the most homogenous peoples on the globe 
(William 3). Considering Koreans share the same ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
background, what are the factors that divided the nation in half and caused the 
current state of mutual hostility?
Ever since the first united Korean kingdom was founded in AD 688, 
foreign powers have competed for influence and control over the country 
(Hoare and Pares 19). One authority on Korean history estimates that there have 
been more than 900 invasions of Korea over the past 2000 years (William 1). 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, China, Japan, Russia, and the West have all 
fought for control over Korea. Korea is located in the centre of this “strategic 
quadrangle,” and each of the regional powers has historically considered Korea 
to be within its sphere of influence (Lee 4). Therefore, throughout its history 
Korea has borne the consequences of the hegemonic struggles between great 
powers. While never truly sovereign because of its geopolitical location, Korea 
was always territorially united. That changed decisively at the end of WWII.
During the final weeks of WWII, the Soviet Union (USSR) and the 
United States (US) pushed into Korea to remove the occupying Japanese. The 
border for the respective occupation zones was drawn along the 38th parallel 
by the two victorious powers. At the Cairo Conference on November 22, 1943, 
it was agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent” 
(William 12). However, the rapid decline of Soviet-American relations 
ruined any chance of a timely unification of Korea by peaceful means. The 
intensification of the Cold War in 1946–1947 stalled attempts at creating a 
united, democratic Korea.  Because no agreement could be reached between the 
two superpowers, the Americans installed Syngman Rhee to govern the southern 
Korean territory. A former Korean exile living in the United States, Rhee was a 
Princeton graduate known for his hard-line anti-communist views (48). To lead 
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the new Communist regime in the north, the Soviets eventually settled on Kim 
il Sung. A former communist resistance fighter, Kim il Sung served in the Red 
Army during WWII (11). Separate elections were held in the new Korean states 
in 1948 to legitimize each power’s chosen representative.
A fanatical nationalist, Kim il Sung could not bear what he saw as the 
permanent division of Korea, so he invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, 
in order to unite Korea under communist rule. After the United Nations (UN) 
“Police Action” pushed the invading North Koreans out of the South, the UN 
gave approval to “achieve the establishment of a unified, independent democratic 
government in the sovereign state of Korea” (14) However, as the UN forces 
pushed northwards towards the Chinese border, the Chinese intervened on behalf 
of the DPRK. UN forces were pushed back to the 38th parallel, where the border 
was permanently agreed upon by North Korea, China, and the United Nations in 
1953. No formal peace treaty has since been negotiated between the ROK and 
DPRK (14). U.S. General Mark Clark observed at the signing of the armistice 
that the war had not resulted in military victory for either side but “instead 
resulted in an uneasy peace with no prospect of a definitive settlement of the 
Korean question” (Clark qtd. in Lewis 160).
III. Strategies for Reunification
The problem of Korean reunification is incredibly complex. Re-joining 
one of the world’s most dynamic and developed economies with one of its most 
dishevelled and repressive is no easy matter. The cultural, political, and, above 
all, economic gulf between North and South are now so great that many experts 
believe reunification is almost inconceivable. It has been nearly seven decades 
since the Korean peninsula was divided, and much of that history has been 
characterized by conflict and tension. However, reunification can come about in 
one of three ways: mutual reconciliation, war, or internal regime collapse. This 
paper will only examine the issue from the South Korean perspective because 
North Korea’s perspectives on reunification are impossible to identify due to the 
totalitarian nature of the regime.  
The scenario the ROK sees as the most optimal is a “soft landing” 
(Terry 154). In this scenario, the North Korean regime would adopt the 
Chinese economic model, abandon militarism, and work towards a gradual 
rapprochement with South Korea. This approach was the ROK’s policy towards 
the DPRK from 1998 to 2007 because it is the most peaceful and economical of 
the three possibilities. This path is best exemplified by South Korea’s ‘Sunshine’ 
foreign policy towards the DPRK that began in 1998 and lasted until 2008 (Jung 
and Rector 488). The main goal of the Sunshine policy was to soften North 
3
Gonsalves: Korea Divided
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
84
Korea’s behaviour towards the ROK by “encouraging interaction and economic 
assistance” (Jung and Rector 492) The goal was to incite reforms within North 
Korea, improve relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, and create goodwill 
between the people of the ROK and the DPRK (494). Unfortunately, the 
Sunshine policy was deemed a failure in 2010 by the South Korean Unification 
Ministry. The ministry statement declared that the “billions of dollars and cross-
border exchanges failed to change the mindset of Pyongyang” (Yong). This 
failure epitomizes the consequences of all the other attempts made by the ROK 
to unilaterally provide aid to the DPRK in return for a calming of tensions (Lee 
4). The Kim Dynasty has shown no interest in serious reform and uses South 
Korean aid and capital to stabilize its rule, providing nothing in return. During 
the Sunshine Period, North Korea fully established its nuclear program and 
tested its first device in 2006. The nuclear of the DPRK testifies to the naivete 
of the ROK government’s belief in a peaceful merger of the two states (William 
85).The failure of the Sunshine policy and the DPRK’s progressive shift towards 
continued militaristic actions illustrates that a scenario involving a ‘soft landing’ 
reunification is not realistic.
Many South Koreans who favour the ‘soft landing’ approach look 
to German history for inspiration. In early 2015, South Korean President 
Park Geun-hye gave a major pro-unification speech in Germany, a highly 
symbolic destination choice (Yong). Since its unification, Germany has made 
great progress and is now among the most dominant and robust economics 
in Europe, an ideal end result for Korea’s reunification. Both nations were 
divided artificially by Cold War politics and split along the capitalist/communist 
ideological line. Both the Federal Republic of Germany (FGR) and the ROK 
eventually became healthy, functioning democracies with successful economies, 
while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the DPRK became 
authoritarian states whose planned economies failed. In addition, the FGR and 
the ROK maintained difficult relationships with their communist neighbours 
throughout their histories. While on the surface there seem to be many parallels 
between Germany and the current situation in Korea, there are also many 
profound differences.
A deeper analysis reveals the disparities between the two situations due 
to the profoundly different relationships the GDR and the DPRK have with their 
respective international benefactors. No state has the same degree of influence 
over the DPRK that the USSR had over the GDR (Lee 21). The GDR was a 
satellite state of the USSR. Thus, when Gorbachev decided to approve the 
reunification of Germany, the fate of the GDR was sealed. The DPRK, on the 
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other hand, is a state intent on defending its sovereignty, and China’s influence 
over the DPRK has been not been substantial enough to direct policy. North 
Korea has openly flouted China in the past and has expressed a willingness 
to do what it sees as best for national interests regardless of what the Chinese 
government thinks. For example, China’s foreign minister denounced North 
Korean nuclear tests in October 2006, and China’s stance has remained largely 
unchanged since (“China resolutely opposes DPRK’s nuclear tests”). The fact 
that the North Korean nuclear program persists to this day, despite Chinese 
opposition, shows that China’s stance on the issue obviously has no effect on 
the DPRK, illustrating that the DPRK will not be pressured by outside forces 
on issues of national importance. Furthermore, Germany did not experience 
a civil war that resulted in millions of casualties, unlike Korea. The lack of a 
military conflict between Germans made the populations of the GDR and FGR 
less hostile to each other and more accepting of reunification.  Both the GDR and 
the FGR maintained a working relationship that lacked the destructive border 
clashes that occur regularly between the ROK and the DPRK (Rhee 372). For 
example, there was no conflict between the GDR and the FGR comparable to the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong, the infamous artillery engagement between the 
North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island 
on November 23, 2010. North Korean forces fired artillery shells and rockets 
into South Korean territories, hitting both military and civilian targets, furthering 
the tensions between the ROK and DPRK (“North Korean artillery hits South 
Korean island”). The peaceful scenario that brought about German unification is 
not present in Korea, and thus the event is not an accurate historical comparison 
for Korean unification.
The second scenario, military conquest, is also improbable. The ROK 
no longer stands by the slogan it maintained until 1960, “March North and 
Unify.” (Research Center for Peace and Unification 70). Current popular opinion 
in South Korea is, in fact, overwhelmingly against a first strike by the ROK 
military against the DPRK. Regardless, South Korea is bound by the ROK-U.S. 
Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT), which forbids an unprovoked South Korean 
strike on the North (69). Additionally, while the DPRK may be militaristic, it 
is not suicidal.  The probability that a DPRK assault and total war on the ROK 
would end in success is minuscule, especially considering the protection the 
ROK receives from America (William 18). The combined forces of the ROK 
and American militaries would almost certainly triumph over the antiquated 
conscript armies of the DPRK, a fact that would be understood by DPRK 
military planners.  Because of this imbalance, it is unlikely that military force 
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alone could result in unification.
Furthermore, one of the most powerful arguments against a Korean war 
over reunification is the existence of the DPRK’s potent nuclear arsenal. North 
Korea has developed and detonated nuclear as well as chemical/biological 
weapons and has tested missiles that may be capable of delivering both at a 
distance. These weapons act as a force equalizer between the DPRK and ROK 
and its allies (72). The DPRK also maintains large amounts of conventional 
artillery within range of major South Korean urban centres. In particular, the 
DPRK is capable of bombarding the ROK capital, Seoul, which contains both 
a quarter of the country’s population and the military’s command and control 
headquarters (Lee 21). While the DPRK would never win a war against the 
ROK, The DPRK would likely use its substantial firepower to attack Seoul and 
other major cities with overwhelming force, seeking to do as much damage as 
possible. A Korean unification through the conquest of the DPRK would likely 
be a pyrrhic victory for the ROK. North Korea could inflict such a heavy toll on 
the South that it would negates any sense of achievement or profit. It is in the 
interests of both the ROK and the DPRK to avoid total war at all costs.
The most likely scenario for reunification is the breakdown of North 
Korea’s government and society, known as a ‘hard landing (William 80). In 
this case, the DPRK would implode under economic and social forces and 
be absorbed by South Korea. This implosion could perhaps be triggered by a 
rebellion, natural disaster, or assassination. A “hard landing” represents the only 
real prospect for reunification. The ideological rigidity of the DPRK has set 
the regime on a path of unrelenting totalitarian control resulting in catastrophic 
consequences for the state. This is because the DPRK and the Kim Dynasty’s 
claim to legitimacy relies on the ideology of Juche. This cornerstone of the North 
Korean state is a combination of Korean ultra-nationalism, a strong sense of 
national self-reliance, and traditional Marxist-Leninist principles (William 18). 
The regime’s connection to the flawed command economy and protectionist 
policies upheld in Juche makes it difficult for the DPRK to initiate the necessary 
reforms the country needs to survive long term. Because it derives its legitimacy 
from Juche, as well as the cult of personality surrounding the ultra-nationalist 
Kim Dynasty, the regime would undermine the basis of its support if it were to 
follow the Chinese example and open the country to significant foreign trade and 
investment.
 In spite of this pessimistic economic forecast, the DPRK, with the 
exception of mostly cosmetic minor reforms, clings to the status quo (Delury 
and Moon). This position, however, is growing increasingly untenable. The 
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North Korean economy collapsed in the late 1990’s and suffers from severe 
shortages of most necessary items (William 68). This collapse has led to 
numerous famines, droughts, and an economy that cannot meet its citizens’ basic 
needs.  In addition, China, North Korea’s single economic backer, has shown 
signs that its patience with the DPRK is diminishing. Recently, criticism of the 
DPRK has become common in Chinese state-controlled media (Perlez). China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly criticized North Korea’s 2016 nuclear 
test, saying Beijing “firmly opposes” the DPRK’s actions (Jiha). This public 
statement underscores Beijing’s deepening dissatisfaction with Pyongyang as 
well as the deteriorating ties between the two allies. Since China provides North 
Korea with most of its food and energy supplies, a waning of Chinese support 
would be devastating to the DPRK. Additionally, the regime’s control over 
information is much weaker than it was twenty years ago. Through black market 
trade across the Chinese border, North Koreans are increasingly aware of North 
Korea’s poverty and the relative prosperity of China and South Korea (Fuqua 
137).  These factors all contribute to the idea that the DPRK is prime for internal 
collapse, furthering the plausibility of a “hard landing” reunification
 On the other hand, academics and experts who have predicted the 
DPRK’s imminent downfall have been consistently proven wrong. The idea that 
the regime in North Korea “stands on the brink of extinction dates back decades” 
(Delury and Moon). Regime collapse is difficult to predict accurately, especially 
since the DPRK’s coercive and repressive tactics have proven very effective 
at maintaining the regime’s control over the population (Hoare and Pares 
43). However, as a comparison, most ‘experts’ on the GDR and the Warsaw 
Pact had no inkling that the end of the Cold War was imminent. In Korea: 
Enduring Division, D. S. Lewis predicted in 1988 that German unification was 
unlikely. He wrote that “the presence of the Soviet Union and its watchful eye 
on developments that might lead to unification renders it improbable that the 
extension of mutual tolerance between the two Germanys will extend beyond 
a certain point” (157) Within a year, the Berlin Wall had come crashing down 
and the U.S.S.R. had given its approval for steps to be taken towards unification 
through the 2 + 4 agreements (Rhee 365). By the end of 1990, Germany was a 
united nation for the first time in fourty-five years. Thus, academics and experts 
on North Korea, just as with the GDR, might be wrong in their predictions and 
should not be discredited due to past incorrect deductions.
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IV. International Implications
 In recent years, tensions across East Asia have increased. The rise of 
nationalism across the region, China’s increasing assertiveness and power, 
Japan’s movement away from its adopted pacifist identity, and ambivalence 
towards America’s long-term commitment in the region have all contributed 
to this unease (Lewis 146). In this era of heightened tensions and strained 
relationships, the amalgamation of both halves of Korea would send shock 
waves throughout the region. A unified Korea could have great implications for 
the balance of power, with South Korea already considered by many a regional 
power.  While unification might pose some short-term challenges for Korea on 
the international stage, in the long term, the end of the Kim Regime in North 
Korea would be in the best interests of all concerned parties.
China is one country which has traditionally been viewed as an opponent 
of Korean unification. The Chinese government believes its geopolitical situation 
would be significantly weakened by the collapse of the DPRK. Because China 
has few allies in East Asia, the potential absorption of the DPRK by the ROK 
could be considered a blow to China’s national security, as The DPRK’s presence 
as an ally helps to solidify China’s position as a regional power. Furthermore, the 
collapse of the DPRK would bring about a military intervention that would bring 
South Korean and American forces to China’s border. Having an American-
aligned power on its doorstep in an era of perceived American encirclement and 
containment might be seen as a the problem for the Chinese (Terry 155). Yet, 
the replacement of the DPRK might also bring China strong advantages. China 
would no longer have to prop up the DPRK through transfers of fuel, food, and 
other goods (Terry 158). Instead, it could provide real investments to the former 
DPRK that would come with profitable returns instead of a capital drain. This 
investment would also give China a public relations victory in the eyes of the 
world, something the country sorely needs as many East Asian nations grow 
increasingly suspicious of Chinese motives and ambitions. By contributing 
towards the rebuilding of North Korea through aid, investment, and expertise, 
China’s prestige would greatly improve in a region that views the country with 
suspicion.
South Korea’s strongest allies would also likely see problems with the 
unification of Korea. Both the United States and Japan would “fear the regional 
chaos and instability that regime change would bring” (Terry 156). In particular, 
both countries are concerned about North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. Experts believe that the DPRK may have between five and 
twelve nuclear weapons (William 85). With the dismantling of the North Korean 
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regime, there would be an increased risk that this nuclear arsenal could fall into 
the wrong hands, causing a security nightmare in an age of global terrorism. 
However, if these weapons were dealt with quickly and efficiently and North 
Korea’s military of 1.2 million active personnel demobilized properly, then the 
risk could be minimized to acceptable levels (Fuqua 87).
Furthermore, Japan might feel threatened by the potential strength of a 
united Korea. According to a 2009 report by Goldman Sachs, within thirty to 
forty years, a reunited Korea could overtake Japan in terms of GDP (Terry 160). 
However, assisting with the fallout of reunification would give Tokyo a great 
opening to dispel the anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans that has lingered 
since the days of Japanese occupation (William 7). In addition, America might 
fear that a stronger Korea would be more independent and, consequently, lessen 
America influence in the region (Lee 21). However, ending the long-term threat 
the DPRK poses as Northeast Asia’s primary source of instability would be 
worth the potential drawbacks.
The country most affected by reunification would undoubtedly be South 
Korea.  Many South Koreans fear the economic cost that would accompany 
reunification.  An advisory body appointed by South Korean President Lee 
Myung-bak in 2011 put the price tag of reunification at over two trillion dollars. 
Most current economic predictions state that reunification would cost the ROK 
up to seven percent of the country’s annual gross national product (GDP) for 
a decade (Phillips). The costs of integrating an isolated, impoverished, and 
brainwashed population of twenty-five million into the modern world would be 
extremely challenging (“North Korea vs. South Korea”). Updating an economy 
that is one of the world’s worst is not an easy feat, as many South Korean elites 
have learned from the German experience. North Korea’s GDP is estimated to be 
around $40 billion and its per capita GDP ranks as one of the lowest worldwide 
at only $1,800 (Jung and Rector 488). In contrast, South Korea currently has the 
world’s thirteenth largest economy, worth $1.849 trillion and a per capita GDP of 
$35,485 (488). The gap between the two countries is astronomical. As a result, a 
large portion of South Koreans grew up in affluence and fear that their standard 
of living would fall if the DPRK joins with the South. Concerns over tax 
increases, budget deficits, international loans, and refugees have caused many 
South Koreans to give up on reunification.
While the immediate issues facing South Korea would be serious, if 
handled correctly, reunification would be desirable in the long term. From a 
security perspective, South Korea would no longer have to be concerned about 
North Korea’s artillery targeting South Korean cities, its navy torpedoing South 
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Korean ships, its commandos targeting South Korean leaders, or its nuclear 
arsenal threatening South Korean existence itself. With this increase in security, 
the ROK could reduce its defence budget from its current $31 billion a year 
while also ending mandatory conscription (Terry 158). From an economic 
standpoint, conscription limits a nation’s economic growth. The practice 
delays young men’s entrance into the workforce and constrains their economic 
potential. Furthermore, acquiring North Korea has serious economic advantages. 
South Korea’s economy is extremely advanced, but the country must import 
ninety-seven percent of its energy, as well as the materials it needs to sustain 
its export sector (Terry 157). North Korea has large deposits of coal, uranium, 
magnesite, and rare-earth metals, but it has neither the capital nor the technology 
to mine them (Terry 157). The technology from the South combined with the 
raw materials from the North would give a united Korea a major competitive 
advantage. Also, access to the northern half of the peninsula would allow the 
ROK to transport goods more efficiently. Currently, South Korea functions as an 
island economy, as the hostile DPRK blocks South Korea’s only access to land. 
In a united Korea, goods would flow freely from Korea to China and Russia, 
reducing both importing and exporting costs, since companies use more efficient 
methods to ship by land. The benefits of a larger labour base, more natural 
resources, and additional territory would lead to a huge overall economic boost 
for Korea in the long term.
As a democracy, public opinion is important in the ROK and pro-
unification sentiment is becoming rarer in South Korea. There is growing 
indifference, doubt, and even opposition to reunification among South Koreans. 
Seven decades have passed since the dividing of Korea. Most South Koreans 
have never experienced a united Korea, and many do not have any personal 
connections with anyone in the DPRK. Among teens, the number of those who 
support reunification has dropped to twenty percent (Phillips). Many South 
Koreans feel that they now have nothing in common with those who live in the 
DPRK because the two Koreas have so dramatically diverged. The ROK needs 
to make a stronger case for reunification to its citizens, especially its youth, if the 
process is to succeed. North Korean popular opinion towards unification is more 
difficult to determine. Citizens of the DPRK have no way of relaying their true 
opinions to the outside world. DPRK defectors are not necessarily representative 
of what the rest of the population truly feels regarding reunification because they 
are all men and women who hated the DPRK enough to risk their lives trying 
escape.
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V. Lessons for the Future
It is unlikely that the Kim regime will come to a clean end. The 
process of reconstructing North Korea, politically and economically, will be 
tremendously difficult. However, the ROK and its allies have the benefit of 
history. By applying lessons learned from the aftermath of the German and 
Vietnamese reunifications, as well as the collapse of the USSR and the eastern 
Bloc, a united Korea could continue the ROK’s legacy of success.
After the collapse of the USSR, economic reforms during the 1990’s in 
the former Soviet empire were not handled efficiently. Mass privatization by 
new regimes, known as “shock therapy,” resulted in heavy unemployment, as 
well as discontent with the new system (Kirschbaum). The breakdown of the 
trade networks within the communist world forced countries to integrate quickly 
into the capitalist world economy. As a result, the GDR (once the Eastern 
Bloc’s leading industrial nation) is now largely devoid of industry. Often state 
enterprises were promptly shut down and sold rather than being retooled and 
run for the long-term benefit of the state (Kirschbaum). Additionally, many 
former GDR residents feel that beneficial organizations and programs, such 
as the twelve-year school system and pre-school care, were ended for purely 
ideological reasons (Kirschbaum). The transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a competitive market economy is not easy. ROK would be wise to 
learn from the consequences of rushing economic reforms and take the necessary 
time to integrate the former DPRK into the modern, globalized world.
 After the French withdrew from their colonies in Southeast Asia, 
Vietnam was divided in two by the 1954 Geneva Accords. America backed the 
new country of Southern Vietnam and poured economic aid and investment 
into the nation. As a result, South Vietnam become financially better off than its 
northern counterpart. In the aftermath of North Vietnam’s victory over South 
Vietnam, massive amounts of North Vietnamese moved to the wealthier south. 
This migration caused the South Vietnamese economy to collapse, creating a 
period of economic decline for the entire country (“Vietnam – Migration”). 
South Korea would do well to learn from the repercussions of Vietnam’s 
unification by maintaining strict border controls along the Demilitarized Zone 
in order to prevent an influx of people moving from North to South in Korea. 
Forbidding North Koreans from moving to South Korea, while unpopular 
amongst the former citizens of the DRPK, would be necessary for a substantial 
period of time to allow both halves of Korea to adjust to the new reality. It would 
be in the best interests of the Korean people as a whole to rebuild Northern 
Korea first because South Korea’s supply of available housing and employment 
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opportunities would never be able to keep up with North Korean demand.
In conclusion, this paper has shown that the unification of Korea will 
not come about with ease. Though the DPRK is susceptible to collapse, the 
militarized and desperate Kim dynasty will not dissolve without firing a shot. 
The DPRK leadership have committed horrendous crimes and would certainly 
be put on trial in front of the International Criminal Court if they ever lost power. 
While the collapse of the DPRK would cause short-term regional instability, 
a ‘hard landing’ is the most optimal scenario for Korean reunification. With 
preparation and planning, combined with the broad support of the international 
community and East Asia’s regional powers, the DPRK can be successfully 
integrated into the ROK. Reunification is in the best interest of South Korea, 
Japan, China, and the US. In the end, those who stand to gain the most from this 
outcome are the North Koreans themselves, finally able to escape from Marxist-
Leninist totalitarianism. Free from a world of labour camps, hardship, and 
repression where conditions are among the worst in the world, those who live in 
the DPRK could, for the first time in their lives, look towards the future with true 
hope.
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